Jenkins of Mexico by Andrew Paxman

Author:Andrew Paxman [Paxman, Andrew]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9780190455743
Publisher: OxfordUP
Published: 2017-09-15T00:00:00+00:00

The Force of Labor and a Quid Pro Quo

It must have seemed to many of his peers that Jenkins was untouchable. In film, sugar, and textiles, he seemed to hold all the right cards, or at least an immunity to laws restricting foreign ownership, banning monopolistic practice, and guaranteeing labor the right to organize. With a friend on the presidential throne, a compadre in the federal cabinet, and another ally as governor of Puebla, Jenkins had three aces up his sleeve. Certainly this is how things looked within the film industry, as his critics later recorded. Yet Jenkins would encounter several drawn-out disputes with labor in which he came off decidedly the worse.

By the standards of the day, Jenkins’s newfound troubles with workers were not unusual, for Ávila Camacho’s term suffered a record spike in stoppages. Despite the president’s calls for national solidarity on Mexico’s 1942 entry into the world war, high inflation and tumbling real-terms wages caused strikes to proliferate. Besides its frequent agitation over the rising cost of living, Mexico’s industrial workforce was fast growing and much given to factionalism. In 1940’s violent election campaign, some unions had backed opposition candidate Almazán.38

However, the fact that disputes at the La Trinidad textile mill and Atencingo were resolved to labor’s benefit seems odd in light of Jenkins’s chumminess with the Ávila Camachos. The pressing demands of labor only partially explain the contradiction. At a given moment, a president had any number of favors and secret incentives he could dole out to whomever was causing the greatest headache. So why would Ávila Camacho inconvenience one of his staunchest and wealthiest allies when there were many more distant capitalists whose interests might be compromised to keep labor leaders happy? And why would he do so when this ally was proving himself useful once again, with a theater expansion plan that suited state interests?

The apparent contradiction owed to a calculation by Ávila Camacho that operated on two levels, one overt and pragmatic, the other tacitly reciprocal. On the visible level, the Trinidad and Atencingo disputes both involved workers who had long agitated for a fairer deal. To side with labor in such cases not only afforded specific workforces tangible gains but also promised the president good publicity and an infusion of political capital in his dealings with labor.

At the covert level, there was a quid pro quo. Ávila Camacho would allow Jenkins vast gains in one field at the expense of lesser losses in others. In the film business, he would let Jenkins develop a highly lucrative, commanding position. (The deal concerned film rather than sugar, for the latter sector was much more the dominion of Aaron Sáenz, who controlled the sugar distribution cartel.)39 In return, Jenkins would render forfeits that benefitted labor, both directly and symbolically, and thus serve Ávila Camacho’s political balancing act. Such forfeits might also enable the president to assure the many left-wingers in his cabinet—which included former president Cárdenas as defense minister—that he was not in thrall to the gringo.

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